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FATHER IN JAIL 
.David C Baldus*t 
MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUP-
PORT. By .David L. Chambers. With Methodological Appendix by 
Terry K Adams. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1979. Pp. 
xiv, 365. $22.50. 
Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child SUJJport ad-
dresses what many observers consider a national scandal - the fail-
ure of divorced fathers to support their children even when under a 
court order to do so.1 Conventional wisdom holds that most di-
vorced fathers pay little or nothing after the first few years of di-
vorce, and they get away with it;2 the children and their mother 
suffer a serious loss of income and the taxpayers are left to pick up 
the tab through the welfare system. Like much conventional wis-
dom, this picture contains an element of truth. In most states, di-
vorced fathers probably pay less than one third of what they owe as 
a group, and over half of them pay nothing.3 To compensate for the 
loss of income resulting from divorce, most wives seek employment 
or remarriage, but for those who fail, welfare is often the only op-
tion.4 
Would this problem go away if divorced fathers paid what they 
owe? Professor Chambers says no. In a provocative analysis, he 
demonstrates that even if fathers paid everything they owe, most di-
• Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. 1957, Dartmouth College; 
M.A. 1962, University of Pittsburgh; LL.B. 1964, LL.M. 1969, Yale University. - Ed. 
t I am grateful for the comments and criticisms of Ronald J. Allen, James W. Cole, 
Thomas F. Pogne, and Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., who read an earlier draft of this review. 
I. The author, David L. Chambers, is a Professor of Law at The University of Michigan 
Law School. During the project, two "research associates" with "experience in the techniques 
of social science research and with knowledge of computer programming" (p. xii) worked with 
Chambers and obviously played a significant role in the data analysis. The methodological 
appendix was written by Terry K. Adams, Chambers's research associate from 1972-1974, 
2. Throughout the book, Chambers refers to the parent with custody of the children as the 
"mother" and the noncustodial parent as the "father." He clearly recognizes that the "custo-
dial" roles of men and women will be reversed with increasing frequency in future years. His 
random sampling in the two counties studied most closely, however, unearthed no noncus-
todial mothers. 
3. Little hard data are available on the rates at which fathers pay nationwide. A 1975 
nationwide sample indicated that about 60% pay nothing, ranging from over 80% in the low 
income groups to about 45% in the higher income categories. See J. CASSETTY, CHILD SUP• 
PORT AND PUBLIC POLICY 65 (1978). 
4. In Genesee County, the Michigan county Chambers studied most intensively, 30% of the 
mothers in the sample were on welfare at some time during the period covered by his study (p. 
60). 
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vorced women with dependent children would still need a substan-
tial income supplement to maintain their pre-divorce standard of 
living, and many would still need welfare. The reason is that after 
divorce, the typical mother needs 80% of her pre-divorce total in-
come to maintain her pre-divorce standard of living. Yet the courts 
generally require divorced fathers to pay no more than 40% of their 
net pay in child support. 5 Thus a policy that ensured full payment 
from all employed fathers (such as the mandatory wage assignment 
law proposed by Chambers) would not eliminate divorced mothers' 
need for more income. 
Although the private activities of remarriage and employment 
are clearly the most attractive ways to restore the divorced mother's 
standard of living, two public policies could ameliorate her plight. 
The first would be to encourage higher awards against divorced fa-
thers. Chambers gives this possibility only summary consideration, 
apparently because of the strong consensus that divorced fathers 
should be required to pay no more than 30% to 40% of their net 
income.6 The second, more feasible approach is to make fathers pay 
more of what they owe. The purpose of Chambers's book is to ex-
amine the relative effectiveness of various means, especially jail, of 
achieving the latter objective. The book's main argument is that 
even though the extensive use of jail makes divorced fathers pay 
more than they would otherwise, the approach is ultimately less ef-
fective than less coercive alternatives, particularly the mandatory 
wage assignment. If jail must be used, then Chambers argues that 
the two best ways to ensure high payment rates are (a) to maintain a 
high jailing rate, and (b) to maintain a "self-starting" enforcement 
system that initiates action against delinquent fathers in nonwelfare 
cases without waiting for the mother's complaints of nonpayment. 
He further argues that long jail terms should be avoided because 
they do not affect general or specific deterrence, and that prosecutors 
and sentencing judges should develop consistent charging and sen-
tencing standards that take into account the father's ability to pay. 
Chambers's argument is based primarily on evidence from Mich-
igan. Since 1917, each Michigan county has maintained a publicly-
supported collection system - the Friend of the Court -which pur-
sues delinquent fathers, whether or not their ex-wives are on welfare. 
The organization and intensity of the enforcement effort varies sig-
nificantly among counties, but throughout Michigan seriously delin-
quent fathers are frequently jailed for substantial lengths of time. 
For example, in Genesee County, 14% of the 411 men in his sample 
5. In Michigan, alimony was almost never included in final divorce orders (p. 287). 
6. This pattern appears to hold not only in the United States but also in Western Europe 
and Russia (p. 270). 
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received jail sentences for nonpayment at one time or another.7 
Michigan courts also make frequent use of less coercive measures, 
such as warning letters, mandatory wage assignments, judicial repri-
mands, and probation. 
A study of child support in Michigan is important because it is 
probably the most coercive system in the United States used against 
fathers whose children are not receiving welfare. In most other 
states, such fathers never face the sanctions with real bite - wage 
assignment andjail.8 Michigan, therefore, stands as a natural exper-
iment from which other states can estimate the likely results if they 
were to adopt similar systems in their jurisdictions. The book is also 
important for what it tells us about deterrence. The results show that 
jail has substantial deterrent value and lead the reader to ask why 
this sanction is so much more effective than the sanctions used in 
other areas of criminal law enforcement. 
What distinguishes this book from most policy-oriented studies 
by law professors is its empirical methodology. To be sure, Making 
Fathers Pay is riddled with value judgments, and they are essential 
to the final argument. The major factual contentions of the book, 
however, are based (a) on statistical analyses of data obtained from 
files in the offices of the Friend of the Court throughout Michigan, 
and (b) to a lesser extent, on interviews with fathers and ex-wives 
and their families, Friend of the Court personnel, judges, and jail 
keepers. The inquiry was massive ( over 17 data sets based on over 
13,000 case files), creatively designed, and meticulously executed, 
with careful attention to the nuances of the data and their meaning. 
In general, Chambers presents his results clearly and objectively, and 
maintains high reader interest by skillfully integrating statistical, sur-
vey, and anecdotal evidence. Of particular interest is the case study 
of Jerry Neal, a hapless father, who was jailed three times over a ten-
year period. Neal's reactions to his personal predicament and his 
scrapes with the Friend of the Court personnel flesh out the statistics 
and buoy the reader's interest when the numbers start to weigh heav-
ily. Chambers also heightens interest by frequently interjecting his 
judgments about the fairness and efficiency of the practices he de-
scribes. The study took seven years to complete and makes a major 
contribution to the literature on deterrence, family law, and welfare 
law. For an "amateur in [the] sophisticated field" of empirical re-
search, as Chambers characterizes himself (p. xii), it is quite an ac-
complishment. 
7. The ground for the sentence is contempt of court. Although a jail term ofup to one year 
is always a possible sanction, the proceeding is "civil" and most criminal due process protec-
tions do not apply. 
8. In recent years, as a result of federal legislation, fathers of children on welfare have been 
subjected to more vigorous enforcement efforts, but rarely to threats of jail. 
March 1980) Father in Jail 753 
Making Fathers Pay develops far too many interesting arguments 
for me to consider in this review.9 In the remaining pages, I intend 
to evaluate what I consider the most important factual contentions in 
the book. My critique is primarily methodological, with an eye to 
the strengths and weaknesses of the major quantitative analyses and 
to the limitations imposed by the available data. 
I. JAIL AS A GENERAL DETERRENT 
The study raises two questions about general deterrence.1° First, 
in a jurisdiction that uses jail, what are the marginal effects of self-
starting versus non-self-starting systems, different jailing rates, and 
different sentence lengths? Second, what changes in average pay-
ment rates could be expected if a jurisdiction that did not use jail 
were to adopt a non-self-starting, low-jailing enforcement system, 
similar to the least coercive of those in use in Michigan? For both 
questions the key outcome is payment rate - the proportion that 
fathers pay of what they owe. · 
The first analysis, designed to show the marginal effects of alter-
native enforcement strategies, is well controlled and based on good 
sample sizes. The data set was constructed from 28 random samples 
(with an average of 430 divorced fathers in each), drawn from 28 of 
Michigan's 83 counties (pp. 304-05). From the individual case files, 
Chambers calculated average payment rates for each county. He 
then performed a statistical analysis to examine the extent to which a 
variety of law enforcement, demographic, and socioeconomic vari-
ables explained intercounty variations in payment rates, which 
ranged from .87 to .45. The most instructive evidence is the follow-
ing regression analysis, whose three factors explained approximately 
75% of the payment rate differences among the Michigan counties. 11 
High-Jail/Se!f-Start Factor - a binary variable that 
treated counties that were both high-jailing (a jailing 
rate of four or more per 10,000 persons in the county 
population) and self-starting as "l" and all other 
counties as "0." 
County Population - The log10 of the county's 1979 
population. 
Unemployment Rate, 1970 
Regression Beta Significance 










9. Of particular note are the discussions of the types of marriages that end in divorce, the 
reasons for seeking divorce, the economic consequences of divorce, and the reasons why some 
fathers pay more than others within a given county. 
10. The theory of general deterrence is that the risk of arrest and punishment discourages 
potential offenders from committing crimes. 
11. The negative signs in front of the regression coefficients and Beta Weights for "County 
Population" and "Unemployment Rate 1970" indicate a negative correlation between these 
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The regression coefficient for the "High-Jail/Self-Start Factor" indi-
cates that, if the other two factors in the model are held constant, 
then self-starting, high-jailing counties have on the average a 14.8-
point higher collection rate than all other counties. The coefficients 
also indicate that payment rates are higher in smaller counties 
(where the divorced fathers are better known to the enforcement per-
sonnel) and in counties with low unemployment rates. These find-
ings are particularly interesting when read together with another 
analysis that suggests that neither an increase in the jailing rate nor 
the adoption of a self-starting policy alone has a significant impact 
on payment rates (p.91 & n. *). Only when a high jailing rate is com-
bined with the self-starting system is a real difference observed. 
Interpretation of the regression results would have been facili-
tated, however, by a report of the confidence intervals about the cru-
cial coefficients, or at least their standard errors. 12 The reported tests 
of statistical significance give us assurance that self-starting, high-
jailing counties collect more than other counties. Without further 
calculations, however, they do not tell us the range of possible error 
in the reported coefficients. Does the estimated 14.8-point difference 
in payment rates fall within a 13-to-17 point range or within a 5-to-
25 point range? 
Chambers's study also includes more finely grained evidence of 
jail's deterrent effect. The research designs are imaginative, and the 
results largely eliminate the nagging possibility that socioeconomic 
or demographic variables not included in the regression model, 
rather than differences in enforcement policies, explain the differ-
ences in payment rates. One analysis defines subgroups of fathers in 
terms of factors that tend to influence payment rates (e.g., the fa-
ther's occupation, his attitude toward reconciliation, and the number 
of children). It then compares the payment rates of a subgroup of 
fathers in a high-jailing, self-starting county (Genesee) with the re-
sults for an identical subgroup of fathers in a low-jailing, non-self-
starting county (Washtenaw). The payment rates are uniformly 20-
25 points higher in Genesee, the high-jailing, self-starting county (p. 
119). Another interesting analysis compares the lifetime payment 
rates of fathers in Genesee and Washtenaw Counties who were 
never arrested or brought before a judge. Payment rates in Genesee 
averaged about 20 points higher across the major occupational 
groups (pp. 158-60, 336, Table 7S). 
variables and county payment rate. A "Beta Weight" is a standardized regression coefficient 
that measures the relative importance of the variable in predicting payment rates. Because the 
magnitudes of regression coefficients depend on the measurement scale of independent vari-
ables, they cannot be compared like Beta Weights. 
12. A confidence interval is a range of values for an estimated characteristic (such as the 
difference between payment rates in high-jailing, self-starting counties and other counties) that 
appears plausible in view of the evidence. 
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Chambers also tested the hypothesis that the length of the sen-
tence (as distinguished from the probability that some sentence will 
be imposed) affects payment rates. A simple correlation analysis 
showed no association between county payment rates and average 
lengths of imposed sentences (p. 238). Chambers then used a multi-
ple regression analysis that sought to explain payment rates with an 
index created by multiplying the rate of-jailing in each county by the 
average length of the sentences imposed (pp. 239-40). This index 
was even less valuable in explaining variations in county collections 
than the jailing rate alone, apparently because judges in most high-
jailing, high-collection counties used very short sentences (pp. 95, 
240). The only problem with these analyses is that Chambers states 
just his conclusions. He reports none of the underlying data or coef-
ficients. Without more information, it is impossible to evaluate de-
finitively Chambers's assertion that imposed sentence length does 
not affect payment rates. 
The second interesting general deterrence question concerns the 
change in payment rates one should expect if a no-jail jurisdiction 
outside of Michigan adopted a Friend of the Court system and ap-
plied a non-self-starting, low-jailing policy. The book does not di-
rectly address this issue, but it does provide some basis for a 
prediction. The most relevant evidence comes from a detailed com-
parison of payment rates in Genesee County, Michigan (a self-start-
ing, high-jailing jurisdiction), with payment rates in Dane County, 
Wisconsin, where jail was used heavily against fathers with children 
on welfare but not at all against other fathers. Dane County's pro-
ceedings on behalf of welfare families were criminal actions-initiated 
by the prosecutor's office. Nonwelfare families, who probably con-
stituted a large percentage of those receiving child support, received 
no public collection assistance and had to rely exclusively on some 
private enforcement mechanism, typically a lawyer (pp. 97-98). The 
variation in payment rates between the two counties was significant. 
In the first year after divorce, the proportion of fathers paying 10% 
or less of what they owed was more than two times higher in Dane 
County (42% v. 16%). And by the sixth year after divorce, the gap in 
favor of the Michigan county had grown to 47 points (71 % v. 24%) 
(p. 77). 
On the basis of this comparison and the study of payment rates 
within Michigan, Chambers concludes: 
Had Dane been a Michigan county with a Friend of the Court and 
with the same population and the same rate of unemployment it had in 
1970, our study suggests that, even if it had been a low-jailing, non-
self-starting county, it would probably have collected over 60 percent 
of all that was ordered (not the 30 percent it in fact received in an 
average year) [P. 98]. 
Chambers's caution - "our study suggests" - is well placed, for 
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this analysis does have limitations. It is only a two-county compari-
son; Dane, the Wisconsin county, was used in the comparison solely 
because it had been the subject of an earlier study, and good data 
were available on it. We have no idea whether it is representative of 
other Wisconsin counties. Nor do we know, again for lack of data, 
the range of payments among Wisconsin counties or how well Dane 
County fathers pay in contrast to fathers in other Wisconsin coun-
ties. Except for the unemployment rate, which was no higher in 
Dane than in Genesee county, we do not have much idea about how 
similar Dane and Genesee counties are with respect to other nonle-
gal factors that may have influenced payment rates. 13 
Thus qualified, however, the conclusion is strongly supported by 
other evidence. Even the lowest-paying Michigan county exceeded 
the Dane payment rate by 15 percentage points (.45 Mich. v .. 30 
Dane), and the median Michigan county exceeded Dane County by 
35 points (.65 Michigan v . .30 Dane) (p. 316). Moreover, the Michi-
gan counties least likely to have good payment rates (large, low-jail-
ing, non-self-starting) had a 27-point better record (.57 Michigan v . 
.30 Dane). On balance, therefore, Chambers's 30-point prediction 
appears quite plausible, although we would be more confident if fur-
ther comparisons had been made with jurisdictions outside Michi-
gan.14 Moreover, because Dane County did use jail against fathers 
with children on welfare, we could reasonably expect the introduc-
tion of a non-self-starting, low-jailing system into a jurisdiction 
where jail was never used at all to produce more than a 30-percent-
age-point improvement in payment rate. 15 
II. JAIL AS A SPECIFIC DETERRENT 
Specific deterrence concerns the impact of jail on the payment 
behavior of the particular men who are jailed. To what degree did 
they make lump-sum payments to buy their freedom, and how well 
did they pay after their release fromjail? 16 The book argues that, in 
general, fathers sent to jail pay more than those who are not, but that 
13. The book states merely that fathers in the Wisconsin county were "reasonably well-off, 
largely white-collar, with [child support] orders no higher in relation to earnings than is the 
case elsewhere in the country'' (p. 72). 
14. Data for such a comparison are unavailable. 
15. The prediction assumes, of course, that other factors affecting payment rates will be 
substantially equal. In Dane County, the .30 payment rate reflects the impact of the County's 
policy of jailing fathers of children on welfare. It probably increased the payments of fathers 
with children on welfare and may also have had a spillover deterrent effect on fathers whose 
children were not on welfare. 
16. The theory of specific deterrence is that future unlawful behavior by individual offend-
ers is suppressed through their experience of arrest, conviction, and incarceration. Normally 
the concept would not embrace offender behavior undertaken to reduce the severity of punish-
ment, as is the case when jailed fathers pay lump sums to obtain their freedom. 
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long jail sentences make fathers pay no more than do shorter 
sentences. 
To support the first argument, Chambers describes in detail the 
payment behavior of a two-county sample of fathers who were sen-
tenced to jail. The jail sentence is nominally imposed for contempt 
of court, and thus the judge often cancels it if the father makes a 
substantial lump sum payment. Responding to this pressure, more 
than half the jailed men bought their freedom with lump-sum pay-
ments, and their post-release payment rates were .53 and .33 in the 
two counties (pp. 218, 222).17 Those unable to purchase their release 
with a lump-sum payment served average terms of about 150 days 
and 85 days in the two counties. Since jail sentences are imposed 
only on seriously delinquent fathers who are likely to remain delin-
quent, it seems that jail encouraged the men to pay. But how would 
they have performed if, instead of jail, they had received some lesser 
sanction? The following table from the book gives some idea. It 
compares the ways seriously delinquent fathers responded to four 
sanctions: (a) a warning letter, (b) a wage.assignment, (c) a judicial 
reprimand or probation, and (d) jail. In terms of total response 
(measured in weeks of post-sanction payment) delinquent fathers re-
spond much more positively to jail than to warning letters (31 weeks 
v. 9 weeks) and to reprimands and probation (31 weeks v. 12 weeks). 
Fathers given wage assignments, however, do better than jailed fa-
thers. But since, by definition, wage assignments can only be im-
posed on men who are employed, the causal factors could well be 
socioeconomic, attitudinal, or personal traits that are also correlated 
with the sanctions imposed. No theory, however, suggests itself to 
support this possibility. On the contrary, it appears quite reasonable 
to assume that the most important nonenf orcement characteristics 
influencing payment rates are randomly distributed among the four 
different groups of sanctioned men. 
The evidence that the length of sentence does not affect payment 
rates is also persuasive. The first comparison is between the behav-
ior of the jailed men in Genesee County, where most sentences are 
for one year, and the behavior of the jailed men in Macomb County, 
where the length of the sentences varies a lot but tends to be much 
shorter (pp. 215-16). More men buy their freedom with lump sums 
in the short-sentence county (68% v. 52%), but since the average 
amount paid is higher in the long-term county ($628 v. $442), the 
expected lump-sum payments are about the same (p. 341 ). There are 
striking differences, however, in the post-release payment rates of the 
17. Chambers makes the interesting point here that it is not at all clear that the money paid 
in lump sums is earned by the father. Rather, most of it appears to be gifts or loans from 
family and friends. He concludes "the transfer seems to me to operate as a tax on the wrong 
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(N = 79) 
Portion making lump-sum 
payments 20% 6% 22% 55% 
Size when paid (mean) $199 $438 $737 $691 
Net weeks from lump-sum 
payments** 1 wk. 1 wk. Swks. 19 wks. 
Regular payments 
Portion making payments 
beginning soon after effort 25% 79% 39% 30% 
Length when paid (mean) 30wks. 73 wks. 18 wks. 38 wks. 
Net weeks from regular 
payments*** 8wks. 57 wks. 7 wks. 12 wks. 
Total response from lump-sum 
and regular payment 9wks. 58 wks. 12 wks. 31 wks. 
"' Defined to include efforts (a) employed within forty-eight 
months of the final order, (b) preceded within six 
months by another enforcement effort, and (c) employed 
when there had been no payments in the immediate 
period preceding the effort. 
** Dollars obtained in lump-sums expressed in weeks' 
worth of payments divided by total efforts including 
those not followed by lump-sums. 
*** Regular payments in weeks in all cases with payments 
divided by total efforts including those not followed 
by any payments. 
jailed men - .53 in the short-sentence county versus .33 in the long-
sentence county. Although this evidence is highly suggestive, its 
force is somewhat weakened by the small sample size ( only two 
counties compared) and the failure of the research design to control 
for the jailing rates of the two counties and socioeconomic and dem-
ographic factors that might also affect post-jail payment rates. A 
statewide cross-sectional regression analysis of the type conducted in 
Chambers's general deterrence analysis would have been more per-
suasive, but the data needed for the analysis were not available. 
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The second and, in my judgment, more reliable measure of the 
impact of sentence length is a series of within-county comparisons of 
the post-release payment rates of men who served jail terms of differ-
ent lengths (3 days or less, 4-10 days, 11-30 days, 31-90 days, and 91 
or more days). Although Chambers reports this comparison for only 
two counties, the evidence is persuasive because it effectively con-
trols for intercounty differences in jailing rates. The inverse relation-
ship between sentence length and post-release payment rates is 
particularly striking in the high-sentence county. There, the pay-
ment rate was only .13 among the men who served 91 days or more, 
while the overall rate for all jailed fathers was .33 (p. 238, Table 9.6). 
The research design does not, however, control for the effects of atti-
tudinal factors that may affect both willingness to work and the 
length of the sentences imposed. For instance, it would not be sur-
prising to find that judges impose longer sentences on the lazy and 
improvident. 
Yet the book's final evidence on the effect of long sentences, a 
regression analysis of factors explaining post-release behavior in 
Genesee County, gives further reinforcement. It shows that at the 
time of release from jail, the best predictor of post-release payment 
behavior is the number of days spent in jail. One year later the best 
predictor of an individual's long-term payment rate is whether he 
had left town (p. 225). · 
Although none of these three analyses is conclusive, the consis-
tency of the results achieved with different research designs strongly 
supports Chambers's conclusion that his data provide "not the 
slightest shred of evidence" that "any group of men is frightened into 
better payments after release, the longer they are held" (p. 239). 
Ill. ARBITRARINESS IN THE JAILING PROCESS 
Delinquent fathers are sentenced to jail in Michig3:D. for con-
tempt of court (p. 175). Under state law, a delinquent father is in 
contempt of court only if he has "sufficient ability" to pay what is 
owed. Nevertheless, the hearing transcripts and interviews with 
Friend of the Court personnel suggest that neither the defendant's 
ability to work or to find work nor the level of his income is of much 
interest to the sentencing judges. But how much confidence can one 
have in this judgment simply on the basis of the court transcripts and 
interviews? Here Chambers brings quantitative evidence to bear 
most creatively. By means of a statistical analysis, he demonstrates 
that among those men who fall greatly in arrears, a disproportion-
ately high percentage of unemployed or alcoholic fathers are sen-
tenced to jail (pp. 207-08). Moreover, these men make much smaller 
than average payments upon their release from jail (pp. 226-27). 
These facts suggest that some incarcerated fathers are, in fact, inca-
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pable of paying in the first place, and that jail is unlikely to influence 
their subsequent behavior. Moreover, both the comments of the 
judges in the trial transcripts and Chambers's interviews with the 
Friend of the Court personnel suggest that some unemployed and 
alcoholic men are being jailed as punishment for their drunken and 
slothful behavior or as a means of scaring the general population of 
fathers into payment. 
A regression analysis also suggests that the probability that a seri-
ously delinquent father will receive a jail sentence is below average if 
he is a manager or professional, or is represented by counsel, and 
above average if he is black. I 8 However, as Chambers points out, 
these results should not be interpreted too broadly. Some of them 
are based on small sample sizes (e.g., only ten managers and profes-
sionals fell far into arrears). Moreover, the regression results regard-
ing race are inconsistent with the results of an analysis of fathers 
sentenced to jail more than once. There, the data suggest that blacks 
are treated mor_e leniently than whites (p. 206). Quite properly, 
Chambers goes out of his way to avoid suggesting that the evidence 
concerning the probability of jailing proves any intentional discrimi-
nation in either charging or sentencing. But in one respect Cham-
bers does not go far enough. He fails to report the details of these 
highly suggestive correlation and regression analyses. On such an 
important issue, the reader is entitled to more than a verbal sum-
mary of the results. 
CONCLUSION 
Making Fathers Pay establishes one thing clearly - in at least 
some contexts, severe sanctions can produce their intended results. 19 
The impact of jail on child support enforcement is even more re-
markable since, in Michigan at least, a father can almost completely 
avoid the risk of jail by leaving the state. Faced with this over-
whelming evidence of impact, why does Chambers oppose the use of 
jail in child support enforcement? First, he objects to jail's undesir-
able side effects. Incarceration brands fathers as criminals ( even 
though the punishment is for civil contempt) and subjects them to 
the degradation and dangers of jail. Equally important, it severs all 
personal and business associations and can seriously damage a fa-
ther's relations with his children. The evidence is clear that many 
jailed men leave the state upon their release. Further, although 
Chambers does not stress the point, jail can not only reduce incen-
18. The regression analysis was run on the sample of cases from Genesee County, a high-
j ailing jurisdiction. 
19. For a perceptive analysis of the contribution Chambers's findings make to deterrence 
theory, see R. LEMPERT, ORGANIZING FOR DETERRENCE: LESSONS FROM A STUDY OF CHILD 
SUPPORT (1980) (mimeo). 
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tives and opportunities for lawful employment but also provide con-
tacts that lead to criminal activity. Finally, the charging and 
sentencing process is often arbitrary ( ability to pay is frequently ig-
nored) and not evenhanded (among 50,000 defaulting fathers in 
Wayne County only 914-2%- went to jail). 
Chambers's second argument is that the social costs of jail cannot 
be justified by the severity of the father's offense. Although from a 
moral standpoint, child support obligations are more important than 
commercial obligations, the delinquent father is nevertheless being 
jailed for debt. Chambers also argues that the community consensus 
supporting the child-support obligations is changing. Adult children 
are no longer generally perceived to have a moral obligation to sup-
port their parents. Chambers believes the divorced father's analo-
gous moral obligation to support his children declines after they 
have lived apart for several years and the mother and children have 
made new lives for themselves. Although he does not expect the le-
gal duty to pay child support to be reduced in the foreseeable future, 
he believes that these changing values reduce the moral justification 
for jail. 
The :final argument against jail is the effectiveness of less coercive 
alternatives. Chambers relies here on the results from Genesee 
County, Michigan, which showed that fathers subjected to wage as-
signments paid much better than fathers who were jailed. The gen-
eral deterrent effect of wage assignments, however, remains 
unknown, and one can never be sure how effective the wage assign-
ments in Genesee County would have been in the absence of the jail 
threat. Moreover, both employers and employees strongly oppose 
wage assignments, especially if, as Chambers proposes, they are re-
quired against all divorced fathers, regardless of whether they are in 
default in their support payments. For all of these reasons, no doubt, 
Chambers presents his argument in favor of mandatory wage assign-
ments only half-heartedly. 
Besides those I have already noted, my complaints about the 
book are few and minor. First, I think it is too long. I found the 
long narrative descriptions of the statistical results wearisome and 
would have preferred that the text include fewer words and more 
numbers, especially the unreported regression results that supported 
several important points. I imagine Chambers was concerned about 
overwhelming readers who lack statistical sophistication. I under-
stand this concern, but I think he could have presented all of his 
statistical results in a manner that was both comprehensive to lay 
readers and sufficiently detailed to satisfy more methodologically so-
phisticated readers. At many points he did just that.20 Second, in 
20. While on the matter of style, I would like also to object to the placement of the foot-
notes at the end of the book rather than at the foot of each page. Since the notes frequently 
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the technical tables, I would have appreciated more attention to sam-
pling error. To be sure, he often includes tests of statistical signifi-
cance. Our ultimate concern, however, is with the magnitude of the 
differences one would expect if Michigan's system were adopted in 
other jurisdictions. These judgments would have been easier to 
make if confidence intervals had been reported for the crucial esti-
mates and regression coefficients. 
Third, I would have appreciated Chambers's thoughts about how 
far his results can be generalized. He tells us why jailing in the child 
support context will naturally provide greater deterrence than it does 
in more usual criminal law contexts (such as burglary or robbery),· 
and this analysis provides a very useful framework for thinking 
about every type of deterrence (pp. 102-04). What he does not con-
sider, however, is the applicability of his results outside Michigan. 
The study purports to address a nationwide problem. Yet, by and 
large, the reader is left to his or her own devices in predicting the 
impact of a Michigan-type system elsewhere. 
Fourth, the study would have been stronger if the results had 
been related to the literature on deterrence and child support. The 
footnotes and bibliography contain references to work in both areas, 
but we are nowhere told what this book adds to the sum of existing 
knowledge. 
Was the project worth the effort? It took seven years and cost 
over $200,000. In my view, the answer is clearly yes. It provides a 
useful baseline for comparing future deterrence research. It lucidly 
clarifies the factual, policy, and ethical issues underlying the child 
support dilemma. It demonstrates the enormous power of a well-
conceived empirical study to untangle complex legal and factual is-
sues. And it demonstrates that under proper guidance, lawyers with-
out methodological sophistication can learn enough about data 
analysis to meet and even exceed the standards of excellence nor-
mally expected in the social sciences. 
relate to data supporting statements in the text, a reader seriously concerned with the validity 
of the reported results has a burden following the text and notes together. 
